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Contribution
1. Analyze a model where voters observe and can
obtain indirect benefits from their neighbors ef-
forts on behalf of one candidate or another.
2. Characterize equilibrium as a Horizontal Linear
Complementarity Problem in a subgame where
voters select into one of two patronage networks.
3. Provide an initial analysis of how the substitute-
complement relationship between violence and
patronage varies with a campaign’s knowledge of
the voters’ social networks and preferences.
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(LP)
Compact matrix algebra recasts (LP) as a Horizontal Lin-
ear Complementarity Problem (HLCP), which is to find
the vector pair (x,y) satisfying:
e0 = By−Ax
x ≥,y ≥0
xTy =0,
(HLCP)
where e0 is the vector with entries that are difference
in optimal efforts when each i ∈ N ignores her neigh-
bors x0i − y0i ; e0 measures i’s intrinsic intensity of prefer-
ence for Candidate A over B. The matricesA andB con-
tain the (cost-adjusted) individual cross-effects for Can-
didates A and B that accrue when any pair of voters i
and j exert effort on behalf of the same candidate, e.g.
individual entries in A equal Aij/ci.
3 Voters, 2 Patronage Networks
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Outcomes
Voters 1 and 2 each exert effort for Candidate A in
equilibrium, forming a 2 person patronage network and
reaping indirect benefits form each other. Voter 3 forms
a singleton network by herself on behalf of Candidate B.
NB that voters are supporting the candidate they intrin-
sically prefer (i.e., without considering their neighbors’
choices).
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1) = (2, 0) =⇒ (x∗1, y∗1) = (2.44, 0)
(x02, y
0
2) = (1, 0) =⇒ (x∗2, y∗2) = (2.22, 0)
(x03, y
0
3) = (1, 2) =⇒ (x∗3, y∗3) = (0, 2)
Slighting increasing voter 3’s preference for Candidate
A (x03 = 1 → 1.3) results in a new equilibrium where
voter 3 joins A’s patronage network and provides A with
positive support, contrary to 3’s intrinsic preference for
Candidate B.
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1) = (2, 0) =⇒ (x∗1, y∗1) = (2.68, 0)
(x02, y
0
2) = (1, 0) =⇒ (x∗1, y∗1) = (2.34, 0)
(x03, y
0
3) = (1.3, 2) =⇒ (x∗1, y∗1) = (2.10, 0)
HLCP Solution & Effects of Violence with 2 Voters
A solution to HLCP exists and is unique so long as the matrix pair (A,B) areW0-matrices, a class of matrices which
generalizes the well known class of P0-matrices and ensure that positive feedback loops cannot expand indefinitely.
With two voters in a complete network we can examine the effects of different types of violence on levels of campaign
effort by voters. In this example we start with a configuration where the matrices of cross-effects for Candidates A
and B are A =
(−1 .4
.7 −1
)
and B =
(−1 .7
.4 −1
)
, respectively.
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Low local information =⇒ Violence-as-substitute: Panels (i) and (ii) illustrate a situation where Candidate A is
not socially embedded in a community. Campaign violence is conditioned on observable efforts by each i ∈ N . Here
violence serves to increase the individual costs of effort on behalf of candidate B (e.g., by increasing the probability
of targeted violence). At a constant level of electoral support violence (implying b′i < bi in (LP)) and clientilism
(ai in (LP)) are substitutes. An increase in the cost to the campaign of one activity results in an increase by the
campaign of the other activity. In Panel (i) each party receives positive support since e0 can be given as a positive
linear combination of −A·1 and B·2 (given below figure). Increasing 2’s costs of supporting B by 0.35 moves the
own-efforts vector e0 into the cone defined by−A·1 and−A·2; increasing 2’s benefit of supporting A by 0.35 results in
an equiivilant shift of e0. Although voter 2 intrinsically supports Candidate B, the disutility of violence or gain from
patronage combined with indirect benefits from voter 1’s support of A result in both voters providing positive efforts
for Candidate A. Also note 1’s higher efforts for A in Panel (ii).
High local information =⇒ Violence-as-complement: Panels (iii) and (iv) demonstrate this case. Here A’s campaign
can use local knowledge of relationships to decrease the amount of benefits derived from B that flow from one voter
to another. A lower cost of violence leads to direct targeting of voter 2’s ability to share proceeds from supporting B
with voter 1. Consequently,B =
(−1 .2
.4 −1
)→ (−1 .2.15 −1 ), decreasing the region were both voters support B to a region of
split support. In Panel (iv) the marginal cost of patronage is less than panel Panel (iii), resulting in an increase in the
level patronage as a result of a decrease in the cost of violence.
Next Steps
Relax assumptions in model:
• Decouple political and violent organizations
• Change information conditions (who knows
more about social network)
• Add electoral borders
• Add patronage and violence decisions by a
second candidate/compaign.
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